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Abstract
Aguiar, Pongou, and Tondji (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the
extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be consid-
ered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley
pay profile under a given technology, the latter profile defining the fair distribution. We
provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley distance, and show that it can be
used to determine the outcome of an underlying bargaining process. We also present
applications highlighting how favoritism in income distribution, egalitarianism, and taxa-
tion violate the different ideals of justice that define the Shapley value. The analysis has
implications that can be tested using real-world data sets.
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1 Introduction
Assume that an organization1 compensates its agents using a pay scheme that possibly violates
one or more of the following ideals of justice:
1- Symmetry: equally productive agents receive the same pay.
2- Efficiency: the entire output of the organization is shared among the agents.
3- Marginality: if the adoption of a new technology increases the marginal productivity of
an agent, that agent’s pay should not decrease relative to the old technology.
How can we measure violations of these ideals of justice for the compensation rule utilized
by the organization? As an answer to this question, Aguiar, Pongou, and Tondji (2018) propose
the Shapley distance, which, for a given production technology f , measures the distance between
an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile at f given by the Shapley value (Shapley
(14)). The Shapley value is the only pay scheme that satisfies all of the three aforementioned
ideals (Young (17)). In fact, the axioms characterizing the Shapley value make it a desirable
concept of fairness (or distributive justice), as is generally acknowledged in the literature (Yaari
(16), Roth (10), Serrano (13)). Moreover, Aguiar et al. (1) provide an orthogonal decomposition
of the Shapley distance into terms that indicate violations of each of the Shapley axioms. This
chapter continues this line of research by analyzing the properties characterizing the Shapley
distance.
Our main contribution is to axiomatize the Shapley distance as a measure of injustice. We
also show that the Shapley distance can be used to determine the outcome of a bargaining
procedure. We imagine a situation in which agents have to implement a fairness prescription
F , defined as the set of payoffs induced, under a fixed technology f , by a set of compensation
rules F satisfying certain ideals of justice. There is an initial pay profile φ that works as a
reference point. Agents may want to depart from φ, but they should implement an outcome
that belongs to the fairness prescription F . This defines a bargaining function that maps
any pair (F, φ) to an element of F . We show that the Shapley distance is the unique (up
to monotone transformations) index defining a bargaining function that satisfies Anonymity
and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), for the set of compensation rules that obey
symmetry, efficiency, and marginality.2
Using several illustrations that include favoritism, egalitarianism, and tax distortions, we
1An organization is defined as a body of agents (including the owner, if any) that operates a production
technology by assigning each agent to a specific task.
2Some of our ideas are reminiscent of Nash’s (1950) pioneering axiomatic characterization of a bargaining
solution; see Binmore et al. (4), Thomson (15), or Serrano (12) for surveys of the bargaining literature.
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show how the Shapley distance can be applied to determine the extent to which a given in-
come distribution departs from the fair ideal, and how unfairness can be further unbundled to
determine its origins.
Together with Aguiar et al. (1), we contribute to the literature that studies economic in-
equality using game theory (e.g., Einy & Peleg (5) and Nembua & Wendji (7)). In particular,
we provide an axiomatic foundation to a notion of unfairness, namely the Shapley distance. A
similar axiomatic approach can be used to characterize the decomposition of this distance as
provided in Aguiar et al. (1).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. After dealing with preliminaries in section
1, section 2 introduces the Shapley distance and our notion of unfairness and contains our main
results. Section 3 presents several applications showing the different ways in which favoritism,
egalitarianism, and taxation distort fairness in revenue sharing. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Organization and Data Set
In this section, we introduce preliminary definitions. We follow Aguiar et al. (1). Let N be a
nonempty and finite set of agents, with |N | = n. A coalition is a nonempty subset C of agents:
C ⊆ N , C 6= ∅.
An organization is a pair (N, f) where f : 2N 7→ R is a technology such that f(∅) = 0. In
what remains, we fix N , so that an organization is completely defined by a technology f . We
denote by Γ the set of all organizations.
A pay scheme is a way to share the output produced by the grand coalition N of agents.3
Definition 1. (Pay scheme) A pay scheme is a function Φ : Γ 7→ Rn that maps any technology
f to a vector Φ(f) = (Φ1(f),Φ2(f), . . . ,Φn(f)) = φ ∈ Rn such that
∑
i∈N Φi(f) ≤ f(N). φ is
called a pay profile, and for each agent i ∈ N , φi ∈ R is interpreted as the payoff of i out of the
output f(N). The set of all pay schemes is denoted Θ.
Notice that we allow for negative payoffs, interpreted as taxation. We also recall the notions
of observation and data generating pay scheme introduced by Aguiar et al. (1).
An observation is a pair (f, φ) where f is a technology and φ ∈ Rn is a pay profile, defined
as a distribution of the output generated by the grand coalition:
∑
i∈N
φi ≤ f(N). In the sequel,
any vector φ ∈ Rn such that ∑i∈N φi ≤ f(N) is called a pay profile, even if it is not the result
of applying a pay scheme.
3Our framework also works if the organization is sharing total cost or total profit. The interpretation of the
axioms will have to be done in terms of the context in those cases.
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Definition 2. (Data generating pay scheme) We say that Φ : Γ→ Rn is a data generating
pay scheme if it is the unique pay scheme such that Φ(f) = φ for any observation (f, φ).
In the context of a limited data set, given by a single observation, we do not have the details
about how the data generating pay scheme Φ distributes the total output for a technology that
is not the observed technology f . We only know the realized pay profile φ for f . However, we
have full information on f , (i.e., we know the exact magnitudes of f(C) for all C ⊆ N).
1.2 The Shapley Value as an Ideal for Fairness
In this subsection, we recall the definition of the Shapley value as well as its fundamental
characterization as a fair pay scheme. This characterization provides an axiomatic basis for
analyzing the different ways in which an arbitrary pay scheme might violate basic principles
of fairness, as departures from the Shapley value prescription. The following definition will be
needed for the statement of these characterizations.
Definition 3. Let i, j ∈ N be two agents, and f be a technology.
1. The marginal contribution at f of agent i ∈ N to a set C ⊆ N such that i /∈ C is
f(C ∪ {i})− f(C), and it is denoted by mc(i, f, C).
2. Agent i is a null-agent at f if for any set C ⊆ N such that i /∈ C, we have mc(i, f, C) = 0.
3. Agents i and j are said to be substitutes at f if for any coalition C ⊆ N such that i, j /∈ C,
mc(i, f, C) = mc(j, f, C).
We now define the axioms that characterize the Shapley value.
Axiom 1. (Symmetry)
A pay scheme Φ satisfies symmetry if for any technology f , and any agents i and j that are
substitutes at f , Φi(f) = Φj(f).
Axiom 2. (Efficiency)
A pay scheme Φ is efficient if for any technology f ,
∑
i∈N
Φi(f) = f(N).
Axiom 3. (Marginality)
A pay scheme Φ satisfies marginality if for any technologies f and g, any agent i ∈ N ,
[mc(i, f, C) ≥ mc(i, g, C);∀C ⊆ N \ {i}]⇒ [Φi(f) ≥ Φi(g)].
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The symmetry axiom is a no-discrimination condition (horizontal equity), requiring that
agents who have identical marginal contributions under a technology f receive the same pay.
Efficiency requires that the output of the grand coalition be fully shared among the various
contributors, and it can also be justified in terms of Pareto optimality. Marginality means that,
if a new technology increases the marginal productivity (or the vector of marginal contributions)
of an agent, that agent’s pay should not decrease relative to the old technology. This is an old
property in neoclassical economic theory, requiring that the payoff of an agent depend only on
his marginal productivity given other agents’ inputs.
The result set out below establishes necessity and sufficiency to characterize the Shapley
payoff function (defined by equation (1) below). The axioms just presented also establish the
Shapley value as a fairness ideal.
Theorem 1. (Young (17)) There exists a unique pay scheme, denoted Sh, that satisfies the
efficiency, symmetry, and marginality axioms, and, for any technology f , it is given by:
Shi(f) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
[f(C ∪ {i})− f(C)], for all i ∈ N. (1)
2 The Shapley Distance as a Measure of Unfairness
In this subsection, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the notion of the Shapley distance
introduced in Aguiar et al. (1). It measures the level of unfairness associated with any pay profile
φ by the distance between that pay profile and the Shapley value. Aguiar et al. (1) show that
it can be decomposed into terms that indicate violations of the axioms that characterize the
Shapley value. We recall this decomposition and illustrate it through several examples.
2.1 An Axiomatic Characterization of the Shapley Distance
In this section, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley distance. Let d :
Rn × Rn → R+ be a distance in Rn. Denote the Euclidean norm defined in Rn by || · ||. Also,
denote the inner product associated with the Euclidean norm by < ·, · >. We have the following
definition of the Shapley distance.
Definition 4. (Shapley distance) For any technology f , the Shapley distance of a pay profile
φ ∈ Rn for f , denoted d(φ,Sh(f)), is the distance between φ and the Shapley pay profile
Sh(f) ∈ Rn at f .
We axiomatize below the Shapley distance. First, we need some definitions.
5
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We consider the set of fairness prescriptions of an arbitrary set of pay schemes.
Definition 5. (Fairness prescription) Given a technology f and a set of pay schemes F ⊆ Θ,
a set of profiles F ⊆ Rn is a fairness prescription at f with respect to F if, for each φ ∈ F ,
there exists Φ ∈ F such that φ = Φ(f).
Our fairness index will be the result of a bargaining procedure, where an original pay profile
φ works as a reference point. The intuition is that an arbitrator requires all agents to implement
a fairness prescription, but the agents are free to choose a new pay profile. They may want to
depart from the status-quo φ altogether. The result of this procedure is a fairness bargaining
function.
Definition 6. (Fairness bargaining function) A fairness bargaining function is a mapping
C : {F} × {φ} → F for any fairness prescription F and pay profile φ.
We propose an axiomatic approach to studying the properties that the fairness bargaining
function ought to have.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation of agents. We define σ(F ) as the set of fairness prescrip-
tions such that ϕ ∈ σ(F ) is a permutation of an element η ∈ F . The first axiom requires that
the fairness bargaining function is invariant with respect to permutations of the prescriptions
and the reference pay profile φ.
Axiom 4. (Anonymity)
For all F ⊆ Rn, all φ ∈ Rn, and any permutation σ on N , (Cσ(i)(F, φ))i∈N = C(σ(F ), (φσ(i))i∈N).
The second condition requires that the solution to the fairness bargaining problem be opti-
mal.
Axiom 5. (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA))
For any set S ⊆ F ⊆ Rn and any φ ∈ Rn, C(F, φ) ∈ S implies C(F, φ) = C(S, φ).
Without loss of generality, we also assume that any F ⊆ Θ is convex and closed.
Lemma 1. The only fairness bargaining function that satisfies Anonymity and IIA is the min-
imal distance bargaining function
C(F, φ) = argminv∈Fd(v, φ).
Proof. To check that the minimal distance bargaining function satisfies Anonymity and IIA
is trivial. To prove uniqueness, we observe that Anonymity implies the following two axioms:
Invariance to Permutations (IP) and Nash Symmetry (NS). The latter axioms are defined below.
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(i) A fairness prescription is closed to permutations if, for any φ ∈ F , (φσ(i))i∈N ∈ F for any
permutation of the set of agents σ : N → N .
Invariance to Permutations (IP): If F is closed to permutations, then Ci(F, φ) = Cj(F, φ)
for all i, j ∈ N .
(ii) A fairness prescription F is said to be symmetric if the set F is symmetric relative to
the 45 degree line.
Nash Symmetry (NS): If F is symmetric and φi = φj for all i, j ∈ N , then Ci(F, φ) =
Cj(F, φ) for all i, j ∈ N .
To complete the proof, we define below the axiom of symmetry relative to a line introduced
by Rubinstein and Zhou (Rubinstein & Zhou (11)).
A line < φ, α >, where φ ∈ Rn is a reference and α ∈ Rn is a direction, is the set of all
points of the form φ + tα for some real number t. We say that F is symmetric relative to
a line < φ, α > if for every orthogonal direction β (β′α = 0), φ + tα + β ∈ F implies that
φ+ tα− β ∈ F .
Rubinstein and Zhou Symmetry (RZS): If F is symmetric relative to a line < φ, α >, then
(Ci(F, φ))i∈N ∈< φ, α >.
If axioms (IP) and (NS) hold, then axiom (RZS) holds. In fact, axiom (IP) implies that, if F
is symmetric relative to the line (t, · · · , t)′ for any real number t, then (Ci(F, φ))i∈N ∈ (t, · · · , t)′.
Moreover, axiom (NS) implies that, if F is symmetric relative to the 45 degree line and φi = φj
for all i, j ∈ N , then (Ci(F, φ))i∈N ∈ (t, · · · , t)′ (i.e., Ci(F, φ) = Cj(F, φ) for all i, j ∈ N).
It follows that axioms (IP) and (NS) imply that, if F is symmetric relative to any line going
through φ, then the solution will be on that line. In other words, axioms (IP) and (NS) imply
axiom (RZS). We conclude that Anonymity implies axiom (RZS), which together with (IIA),
implies, thanks to Proposition 2.1 in Rubinstein & Zhou (11), that
C(F, φ) = argminv∈Fd(v, φ).
Next, we define our fairness index.
Definition 7. (Fairness index) A fairness index is a mapping (ρ : Rn×{φ} 7→ R+) such that
there exists a fairness bargaining function C defined as follows:
C(F, φ) = argminv∈Fρ(v, φ).
We are ready to present our main result.
7
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Theorem 2. (Shapley Distance). Let C be a bargaining function that satisfies Anonymity
and IIA. Then the Shapley distance is the unique (up to monotone transformations) value of
the fairness index defining C at any point (F, φ) where F is induced by the set F of pay schemes
that satisfy symmetry, efficiency, and marginality.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the bargaining function C is defined by the minimal distance function:
C(F, φ) = argminv∈Fd(v, φ) for any convex and closed set F . By Theorem 1 (see also Young
(17)), we know that, for any technology f , the fairness prescription F induced by the set
of pay schemes that satisfy symmetry, efficiency, and marginality is the singleton {Sh(f)},
which is a convex and closed set. It follows that C(F, φ) = argminv∈{Sh(f)}d(v, φ). But
minv∈{Sh(f)}d(v, φ) = d(Sh(f), φ), which completes the proof.
Different choices of the distance function provide different fairness indices. We focus now
on a particular choice, the Euclidean distance, which is shown by Aguiar et al. (1) to have an
additive (and orthogonal) comparability property in terms of the different axioms of fairness,
hence justifying its use. As recalled below, the square of the Shapley distance has a unique
decomposition into terms that measure violations of the classical axioms of the Shapley value.
This approach is analogous to that of Aguiar & Serrano (3) who study departures of a demand
function from rationality. Despite the similarities in the two approaches, in this paper we
address a different question in a different environment.
Moreover, in finite data sets, these terms can be used to make partial inferences about
the violations of the axioms defined for complete data sets, and to make complete inference
about the violations of the axioms defined for a fixed technology, for the subset of monotone
technologies (see also ? )). This is of interest because the observer usually does not have
information about a pay scheme under different technologies, making it practically impossible
to check the validity of the axioms that require comparisons between different technologies.
2.2 A Decomposition of the Shapley Distance with Limited Data
Sets
We now present a decomposition of the Euclidean Shapley distance, or Shapley Distance for
short. In this section, we follow the set-up in Aguiar et al. (1). Let f be a technology and
φ ∈ Rn an observed pay profile generated by a pay scheme that may not be known (to the
observer). We can always decompose it into a sum of the Shapley value at the observed
technology f and an error term φ = Sh(f) + esh, by defining esh = φ−Sh(f) ∈ Rn. Moreover,
8
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we show that the error term esh can be further decomposed uniquely into three vectors that
are orthogonal to each other, with these vectors being respectively connected to the violation
of symmetry (sym), efficiency (eff), and marginality (mrg). Formally, this means that we can
write esh = esym + eeff + emrg such that the inner product of these axioms errors (roughly their
correlation) is zero.
Aguiar et al. (1) find this orthogonal decomposition to be the result of the following proce-
dure. First they find the closest pay scheme to φ that satisfies sym; then they find the closest
pay scheme to φ that satisfies eff in addition to sym; and finally they find the closest pay
scheme to φ that satisfies mrg in addition to sym and eff , which is simply the Shapley value
itself. The described order, in which these constraints are imposed, is the only one that pro-
duces the orthogonality of the different error vectors. This decomposition is also meaningful
as each component measures a quantity of economic interest that completely and effectively
“isolates” one of the three conditions sym, eff and mrg.
Begin by fixing a pair consisting of an observed pay profile and a technology (f, φ) and
consider the Shapley distance of φ at this point, which is:
||esh|| = ||φ− Sh(f)||.
Let vsym be the closest pay scheme to φ that satisfies symmetry (pointwise under the chosen
norm) (i.e., vsym ∈ argminv∈Θ||φ − v(f)|| s.t. v satisfies sym).4 Aguiar et al. (1) prove that
each entry evaluated at f is given by vsymi that corresponds to the average pay according to φ
among the agents who are substitutes of i under f . They then establish that φ can be written
uniquely as the sum of its symmetric part vsym = vsym(f) and a residual esym that is orthogonal
to vsym under the Euclidean inner product:
φ = vsym + esym.
In a similar way, let vsym,eff be the pay scheme that is pointwise closest to the symmetric
pay scheme vsym and that satisfies efficiency (i.e. vsym,eff ∈ argminv∈Θ||vsym − v(f)|| s.t. v
satisfies sym and eff). Aguiar et al. (1) prove that vsym,effi = v
sym,eff
i (f) is given by the
summation of vsymi and the output wasted by φ divided by the number of agents in N . It
follows that vsym can be uniquely written as:
vsym = vsym,eff + eeff ,
where eeff is the negative of the wasted output by φ divided by the number of agents in N .
4Existence is easy to verify noticing that the space of symmetric pay schemes is convex and closed.
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Finally, remark that the pay scheme satisfying the axiom of marginality that is pointwise
closest to the symmetric and efficient pay scheme vsym,eff , which we denote by vsym,eff,mrg, must
be the Shapley value because of the uniqueness established in Theorem 1. Thus vsym,eff,mrg =
Sh(f). Thus, we let emrg = vsym,eff − Sh(f). Notice that we can always decompose φ
(pointwise) as:
φ = Sh(f) + esh,
because φ and Sh(f) belong to the same vector space. With all this in hand, Aguiar et al. (1)
establish the following main result.
Theorem 3. (Aguiar et al. (1)) For any given observation (f, φ), we have the unique pointwise
decomposition:
φ = Sh(f) + esym + eeff + emrg.
Moreover, the distance to the Shapley pay scheme can be uniquely decomposed as:
||esh||2 = ||esym||2 + ||eeff ||2 + ||emrg||2,
into its symmetry, efficiency, and marginality departures, such that for any i, j ∈ {sym, eff,mrg},
i 6= j, < ei, ej >= 0.
The proposed decomposition of the Shapley distance that we just stated has economic
meaning described hereunder:
a) ||esym||2 = ∑
i∈N
[φi − vsymi ]2, where for any agent i, vsymi is the average payoff within the
class [i]f of agents who are substitutes of i at f . This means that ||esym||2 is a dispersion
measure within equivalence classes of agents. In other words, this quantity measures
horizontal inequity, which is the inequality among agents who are identical.
b) ||eeff ||2 = E2/n, where E = [f(N)− ∑
i∈N
φi] is the total waste produced by the pay profile.
This means that ||eeff ||2 increases solely due to the lack of efficiency.
c) ||emrg||2 = ∑
i∈N
[vsym,eff−Sh(f)]2, where vsym,eff is the symmetrized and efficient pay profile
that is closest to the original pay profile φ. This means that ||emrg||2 is a measure of
departures from the marginality principle conditional on fulfilling horizontal equity and
efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, ||esh||2, introduced in Aguiar et al. (1), is the first measure
of departures from the Shapley axioms. It has the advantage of providing a unified treatment
10
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of the three axioms in the form of a numerical and additive decomposition. Furthermore, in
the decomposition analysis, each component of ||esh||2 measures a violation of a Shapley axiom,
with the main result providing a formal and unified theoretical foundation for using the three
components.
3 Some Applications
In this section, we feature several applications of our analysis. They are attempts to enhance
our understanding of inequality, and answer the question of when income inequality can be
considered unfair. The different applications show how favoritism, egalitarianism, and taxation
distort fairness in revenue distribution.
3.1 Favoritism
Consider the following simple example:
Example 1. The nephew’s problem. Let an organization consist of a set of agents N = {1, 2, 3}
and a technology f defined as follows: f(N) = 10, f({1, 2}) = 4, f({1, 3}) = f({2, 3}) = 9,
f({i}) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. The environment describes a firm owned by agent 3, who employs a
nephew (agent 1). Agent 2 is also employed in the firm, with no family connections to the other
two people. Although from the point of view of productivities, agents 1 and 2 are substitutes,
agent 3, exhibiting favoritism toward agent 1, allows him to show up to work only half of the
time, leading to output waste. In addition, the uncle has set the pay scheme Φ(f) = (2, 1, 4).
Note that the Shapley value yields the pay profile Sh(f) = (2.5, 2.5, 5). Thus, the overall
(squared) Shapley distance is 3.5, decomposed as 0.5 (attributed to the violation of symmetry)
and 3 (attributed to the violation of efficiency). No violation of marginality is observed, after
one corrects for the other two failures: the moves in R3 describe a first transition from (2, 1, 4) to
(1.5, 1.5, 4) -correcting for symmetry-, and then to (2.5, 2.5, 5) -correcting for efficiency-, which
is the Shapley value. In this example, favoritism causes an efficiency flaw that, according to
our measure, is 6 times as important as the lack of symmetry.
3.2 Egalitarianism versus Fairness
Our second illustration relates to the egalitarian pay scheme. Before showing it, we need
to present a generalization, due to Hsiao & T.E.S. (6), Pongou & Tondji (9), and Pongou
et al. (8), of the framework of an organization, to an environment where agents have more
11
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than two options (i.e, active or inactive). A production environment is modeled as a list
G = (N,L,G) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a nonempty finite set of agents of cardinality n;
L = {0, 1, 2, . . . , l} is a nonempty finite set of hours of labor or effort levels that an agent can
supply, with 0 denoting a situation of inaction; and G is a production function that maps each
action profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Ln to a real number –output– G(x). The function G can also
be interpreted as the aggregate profit or cost function. Interpreting it as the profit function
might be useful in certain settings, in that it could be incorporating both production and cost
functions. Regardless of the interpretation, we assume that G(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0, which means
that no output is produced when all the agents are inactive.
We denote by ei the i
th unit vector (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where all the entries are zero
except the ith component which is one. We will also use the symbols E and C, which we
define as explained hereunder. Let x, x ∈ Ln be two effort profiles. We write x E x to mean
that xi 6= xi ⇒ xi = 0, and we write x C x to mean that x E x and x 6= x. For example,
(1, 7, 5, 0, . . . , 0) C (1, 7, 5, 1, 5, 0, . . . , 0). We denote by |x| = | {i ∈ N : xi > 0} | the number of
agents who are not inactive at x. We maintain the assumption of monotonicity in the production
function environment. The analogous monotonicity property for the production function says
that G(x) ≤ G(y) whenever xE y.
For any production environment G = (N,L,G), a pay scheme for the production maps any
effort profile x ∈ Ln to a nonnull payoff profile ΦG(x) = (ΦG1 (x),ΦG2 (x), . . . ,ΦGn (x)), where for
all i ∈ N , ΦGi (x) ∈ R is interpreted as the payoff earned by i out of the output G(x). In
the production environment, an observation is a triple (x,G,ΦG(x)) where φ = ΦG(x) is an
observed pay profile for any production function G and for any effort profile x.
The corresponding Shapley value for the environment G, denoted by ShG, is given by:
ShGi (x) =
∑
xC x, xi=0
(|x|)!(|x| − |x| − 1)!
(|x|)! [G(x+ xiei)−G(x)], for all i ∈ N. (2)
Aguiar et al. (1) show that, for a fixed level of efforts x, all the information given by the
production environment can be equivalently expressed using a technology.
We now show how the egalitarian pay scheme distorts fairness in revenue distribution. This
pay scheme is the benchmark that implements perfect equality. It divides the output in equal
parts to each agent. So, this pay scheme is clearly efficient. Evidently, given different levels of
efforts and productivities, the egalitarian pay scheme may not be fair, failing marginality. Our
aim is to measure the divergence of the egalitarian pay scheme from the Shapley value and to
identify the sources of this divergence. We do this through the following example in which, for
simplicity, we assume two agents, with each choosing his effort level from a set that contains
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two levels.
Example 2. Consider a production environment G = (N,L,G) where N = {1, 2} is the set
of agents, L = {0, 1} is the set of effort levels, and G is the (monotone) production function
defined as follows:
G(x) =
 1 if x 6= (0, 0)0 if x = (0, 0) (3)
Consider the egalitarian pay scheme Eq defined as follows:
Eq1(x) =
1
2
G(x) and Eq2(x) =
1
2
G(x), for each x ∈ L2.
For each x ∈ L2, we have Eq1(x) +Eq2(x) = G(x), which means that Eq is efficient.
In order to quantify the violations of the properties that characterize the Shapley value, let us
first derive the Shapley payoff of each agent at each vector x. The Shapley payoff profile at each
x is given by the following matrices: ShG(X) =
(0, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (1
2
, 1
2
)
, where X =
(0, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (1, 1)

is the matrix that contains all of the possible vectors of effort levels, with the first component
of each cell denoting the effort level of agent 1, and the second component denoting the effort
level of agent 2.
The egalitarian payoff profile is given by: Eq(X) =
(0, 0) (12 , 12)
(1
2
, 1
2
) (1
2
, 1
2
)
.
Using the difference between the two matrices, ShG(X) − Eq(X) =
 (0, 0) (−12 , 12)
(1
2
, −1
2
) (0, 0)
,
we can compute the Shapley distance ‖ShG −Eq‖2 =
0 12
1
2
0
.
Note that Theorem 3 applies for each fixed effort level, equivalently for each entry of the
matrix X.
We now determine how the amount by which the violation of each property characterizing
the Shapley value contributes to the total violation of fairness by an egalitarian payoff for any
production function and any number of agents. We know that:
Eq(x) = ShG(x) + esym + eeff + emrg.
1. Let esym = Eq− vsym = 0. For all effort levels x, because Eq satisfies symmetry trivially.
2. Let eeff = vsym − vsym,eff = 0. For all effort levels x, because Eq satisfies efficiency
trivially.
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3. Let emrg = vsym,eff−ShG = Eq−ShG. This means that the Shapley distance in general
for this case is equal to ||ShG−Eq||2 = ||emrg||2. This implies that a perfectly egalitarian
pay profile may still be unfair given certain productivity and effort levels.
3.3 Taxes
In our third example, we illustrate how a tax levied over a fair wage can alter the fairness in
an economy.
Example 3. Consider a small economy of two agents 1 and 2 who have to work to produce
goods and services. Each agent has two options, either go to work (option W ), or stay at home
(option H). The production function is given by: f(H,H) = 0, f(H,W ) = 2, f(W,H) = 1, and
f(W,W ) = 5. We observe that both agents work (i.e., we observe the effort profile (W,W )).
This implies that the Shapley wage function allocates a payoff of 2 dollars to agent 1, and a
payoff of 3 dollars to agent 2.
We assume that both agents have to contribute for a public good. For simplicity, we assume
that the benefits from the public good are not received immediately and we can ignore them
in the payoff profile. The vector Φ = (2(1− α), 3(1− α)) represents the revenues of agents net
of contributions, given that each agent contributes a positive proportion α of his/her revenue.
How far is Φ from the Shapley allocation Shf = (2, 3)?
The Shapley distance is given by ||esh||2 = ||Shf − Φ||2 = 13α2. We now determine how
the amount by which the violation of each fairness property characterizing the Shapley value
contributes to the total violation of 13α2.
1. esym = Φ−vsym. Since agents are not identical, it follows that Φi = vsymi and esym = (0, 0).
2. eeff = Φ − vsym,eff . For each i ∈ {1, 2}, vsym,effi = Φi + 5−
∑
Φi
2
. After calculations,
vsym,eff = (4+α
2
, 6−α
2
), and ||eeff ||2 = 25α2
2
.
3. emrg = Shf − vsym,eff = (−α
2
, α
2
). Then, ||emrg||2 = α2
2
. A quick verification confirms
that ||emrg||2 + ||eeff ||2 = 13α2. In general, we observe that the tax has an increasing and
nonlinear distortion of fairness. When α → 0 there is no unfairness in the economy, and
when α→ 1 the unfairness level reaches its maximum.
Assuming that each agent contributes half of his/her revenue (i.e., α = 1
2
), the departure
from the Shapley allocation is ||esh|| = 1.8 dollars. In addition, 96.15 percent of this value is
explained by the violation of efficiency, and 3.85 percent by lack of marginality.
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The previous example provides an upper bound to the cost of fairness. However, we made
the strong assumption that there is no enjoyment of the public good by the agents. Here we
relax that assumption and provide a lower bound of the cost of fairness.
Example 4. We consider the same economy defined in Example 3, but we assume that there
is monetary (equivalent) benefit of the public good that can be enjoyed by both agents imme-
diately. The total tax revenue is given by 5α dollars. We assume that each agent enjoyment of
the public good is 5
2
α dollars. This implies that the adjusted payoff after taxes and considering
the public good utility is Φ = (1 − α)(2, 3) + α(5
2
, 5
2
). In other words, the government is able
to implement a convex combination of the Shapley wage and the egalitarian wage using a fully
efficient tax to provide a public good that produces the same enjoyment to both agents.
The Shapley distance is given by ||esh||2 = ||Shf − Φ||2 = α2
2
. We notice that the new
pay scheme is both efficient and symmetric, hence ||esh||2 = ||emrg||2, which coincides with the
marginality error in the previous example. In this example, the government is able to eliminate
the efficiency loss and only the marginality loss remains. Note that when α→ 1 there is a loss
of ||esh|| = 1√
2
≈ 0.707 dollars in terms of unfairness to produce a fully egalitarian income. This
is 14.14% of the total output. This is of course a lower bound to the cost of fairness (while the
previous example represented an upper bound).
For our final example, we consider a different tax scheme and explore its implications for
fairness.
Example 5. We consider the same economy defined in Example 3, but we assume that the
investment in the public good is done by using a lump-sum tax scheme, as opposed to the
proportional tax scheme. Specifically, each agent contributes the amount ti, i ∈ {1, 2}, such
that t1+t2 = X, where X represents the worth of the public good. The vector Φ = (2−t1, 3−t2)
represents the revenues net of taxes. What could be the values of ti, such that the vector Φ is
close to the Shapley payoff vector Shf = (2, 3)? The distance between the two vectors Φ and
Shf is given by the numerical expression d(t1, t2) = t
2
1 + t
2
2. To answer the question posed, we
should solve the following minimization problem:
minimize
x
t21 + t
2
2
subject to 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 2 ; 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 3 ; t1 + t2 = X ; 0 < X ≤ 5.
(4)
Solving problem 4 yields t∗1 = min(2,
X
2
) and t∗2 = min(3, X − t∗1). Assume that the amount of
the public good X equals 4.5 dollars, then agent 1 contributes t∗1 = 2 dollars, agent 2 contributes
t∗2 = 2.5 dollars. The payoff vector is Φ = (0, 0.5) net of taxes. The distance between both
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allocations Φ and Shf is ||esh|| = 3.20 dollars. The vector Φ does not violate the symmetry
property, since agents are not identical. The violation of efficiency, measured by ||esh|| = 3.18
dollars, represents 98.78 percent of the total measure of unfairness ( ||e
eff ||2
||esh||2 = 98.78), whereas
only ( ||e
mrg ||2
||esh||2 = 1.22) of unfairness is explained by the lack of marginality. Again, this is an
upper bound of the cost of fairness. Due to the decomposition, it is easy to see that the way
to reduce the important cost of fairness is to reduce the efficiency error. This can be done by
taking into account the benefits of the public good. If the benefits of the public good are fully
internalized, only the marginality error will matter, and that is smaller than in the tax schemes
of previous examples.
4 Conclusions
We have provided an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley distance, which is a measure of
unfairness in revenue distribution introduced by Aguiar et al. (1). It is defined as the distance
between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology. Aguiar
et al. (1) provide a decomposition of this distance into terms that measure violations of each of
the Shapley axioms. In this chapter, we have shown that the Shapley distance is the unique (up
to monotone transformations) index defining a bargaining function that satisfies Anonymity and
IIA for the set of pay schemes that obey symmetry, efficiency, and marginality. The analyses
are illustrated through examples showing the different ways in which favoritism, egalitarianism,
and taxation distort fairness in revenue sharing. We have also identified a tax scheme that
minimizes this distortion.
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